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INTRODUCTION

THIS PAPER STUDIES competition between two profit maximizing firms in space
who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price. We will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence-and properties of equilibria in location and price.
Starting with Hotelling [9] , the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms. Hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand. He also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source. Hotelling claimed that a Nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded "back-to-back" locations at the center of the market. Many authors, most recently, D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse [2] have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for Hotelling's model. However, if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices, Hotelling's conclusions hold. Subsequent work by Smithies [14] , Hartwick and Hartwick [7] , and Eaton [3] claimed to show that a Nash equilibrium in f.o.b. prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribution of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems. The work of D'Aspremont et al. casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions. Our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets, with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms. Our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers. Our firms will be allowed to be different, that is, have differences in production and transport costs. However, the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f.o.b. In many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing analogue of Hotelling's work. This work is based upon Lederer [12] which contains additional results and generalizations. Some of these details, including issues of competitive location, pricing, and production are found in Hurter and Lederer [10] . We present our model to study markets in which price discrimination through freight absorption occurs, typically those with goods having low values in relation to transport cost, and having oligopolistic competition, and where producers have transport cost advantages. We will also require that demand elasticity with respect to price be low. Markets having these characteristics include cement, plywood, fertilizer, and sugar.
Hoover [8] in his early work analyzed spatial price discrimination for firms with fixed locations. He concluded that a firm serving a market point would have a local price constrained by the marginal cost of service of other firms. In situations where demand elasticity is not too high, this will result in delivered prices at market points equal to the marginal cost of the firm in the market with the second lowest marginal cost. This result is similar to that recently presented by Haddock [6] relating to the cause for the existence of base point pricing. We will find that the equilibrium prices in our model, defined and characterized in a rigorous manner, have a similar property.
Our approach to the problem will be to study the location-pricing problem in a sequential manner. We will assume that firms locate first, and then set prices. This last stage of price setting and competition is closely related to the models of price competition first studied by Bertrand [1] , and more recently by Friedman [4] and Grossman [5] .
We will first state our model, define a location-price game for the firm and an appropriate solution concept, and show that an equilibrium in terms of the solution concept exists and is easily characterized. Then, we will demonstrate general properties of the locations of the firms in equilibrium. Among our results will be that firms in equilibrium do not locate coincidentally. Finally, we will indicate generalizations that follow easily.
THE MODEL
Let two firms, denoted A and B, be located in a compact market region, a subset of R2 denoted S. Let the locations of the firms be respectively indicated by ZA = (XA, YA) and Zb = (XB, YB). Assume that both firms may costlessly relocate in S and produce the same, single good. Let CA be the constant marginal cost of production for firm A; similarly for CB.
Let each firm have a cost of transporting the good from its location to a point in the market. Let the transport cost per unit shipped from the firms be given by the functions fA(zA, z), fB(ZB, z). We require that f2 be Lebesque integrable in z for all zi and continuous in zi for all z. Thus distance measures need not be Euclidean.
Let the market be distributed with customers each of whom wish to purchase a single unit of good. We assume that the distribution of customers is given by a Lebesque integrable function p:S-->R. We will require p2 to be Lebesque integrable over S to insure integrability of our profit functions.
We will assume that each firm announces a "price policy": a function which specifies the price at which the firm will offer to sell and deliver the good for each market point; it is a "delivered price schedule." Let P be the set of all price policies such that its square is Lebesque integrable over S. A price policy for A will be written PA. PA(Z) is the price at which A will deliver a unit of good to a customer at z e S.
We will assume that customers buy from the cheapest source. The class R * will be important in later results. Technically, it will enable us to avoid defining equilibria in terms of e-equilibrium concepts. In order to explicitly calculate a firm's profit, a sharing rule must be specified. 
EQUILIBRIUM
We next define a meaningful noncooperative solution for the location-price game. The natural solution concept is the Nash equilibrium. It turns out however that the set of Nash equilibria for Fr will be too large, will be too hard to characterize, and will contain many strategy pairs that reflect irrational threats. To eliminate these irrational threats and characterize a set of solutions we will use a stronger equilibrium concept which we will call the location-price equilibrium.
DEFINITION:
A location-price equilibrium for Fr will be a d e D that is a subgame perfect and undominated.
Subgame Perfectness
The proper subgames for Fr include the entire game and a game for each pair of location choices for the firms involving the choice of price policies by the firms assuming they are located at the locations specified.
If d is subgame perfect, Selten [13] , d is a Nash equilibrium for the entire game and d must specify where the firms will locate. Also, d must specify price policies that are optimal against each other, in the sense of Nash, for every possible location pair for the firms. Our restriction on d is similar to that proposed by Grossman [5] and many others in the literature. He requires that firms propose strategic price-quantity proposals that insure the firms earn nonnegative profits, considering fixed costs as well as variable ones.
CHARACTERIZING THE LOCATION-PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
The requirement that a location-price equilibrium be subgame perfect, as opposed to just Nash, eliminates strategies where a firm threatens to price both below its own total marginal cost and its competitor's total marginal cost if the competitor does not locate at a particular point. Such strategies can be designed to make any pair of locations for the firms a Nash equilibrium. Such strategies are unreasonable. If the competitor does not locate at the desired point the firm will not rationally be expected to make good with the threat. In fact, the firm will not price at any market points where the firm serves customers on any subgame below its own total marginal cost. This result, like many to follow, is qualified by the provision that this rule may not hold on a set of market points where total demand is zero.
DEFINITION: We will say that a property holds on a set T c S except on a set of demand zero, edz, if the property holds on every point of T except perhaps on a measurable set T'c T such that fIT' p(z) dz = 0. If Tc S and is measurable and fJT p(z) dz > O, we say that T is a set having positive demand. This lemma is proved by demonstrating that if the conclusion is not true a firm serving and pricing below marginal cost can alter its price schedule and increase its profit. A formal proof is found in the Appendix.
We next demonstrate that unless the sharing rule utilized is a cost advantage sharing rule, a subgame perfect equilibrium cannot be expected to exist. The insight afforded by the previous lemma is the following: Suppose two firms share a set of customers, and one of the firms is pricing strictly above its total marginal cost on some subset of the shared set that has positive demand; then this firm can strictly increase its profit by undercutting its competitor. A formal proof will be found in the Appendix. It is intuitively plausable to require that the sharing rule belongs to W*. There can be no equilibrium without it! We make this requirement and show later that the set of location-price equilibria for Fr is invariant over R*.
It is to be noted that subgame perfectness does not eliminate the threat of predatory pricing of the following type: "If you do not locate where I wish you to, I will price on sets having positive demand at or above your marginal cost but below my marginal cost of supplying these points." In effect, I will allow you positive profits on these sets but will hold your profits down. Such threats, though strategically important, are dangerous for the initiator. If there is the slightest chance that the competitor would not match the firm's price on the described sets (this would be his optimal price choice) the firm would suffer a loss. If this consideration occurs to the firm, and it considers the chance of the competitor mispricing to be small but positive, then the firm should never price as described: a firm in equilibrium should never price below its marginal cost. In spirit, this analysis is that of Selten's perfect (or trembling hand) equilibrium. The analytic details involved in dealing with this solution concept for strategy spaces comprising, in part, the choice of a price policy from a Lebesgue integrable set of functions are considerable. (A probability space of such functions must be described along with convergence concepts.) Instead, identical results can be obtained by requiring each firm to utilize undominated strategies. In equilibrium, prices are the maximum of the firms' marginal cost, both firms price identically, and each customer is served by the cost advantaged firm. The cost advantage sharing rule helped us to avoid defining an equilibrium in terms of an E-equilibrium where the advantaged firm slightly undercuts the other's marginal cost.
We will refer to p* as an equilibrium price policy. If equilibrium price policies are used by both firms and the firms locate at (ZA, ZB), then the profit for firm i under sharing rule r* E R * will be (ZA, P*(ZA,ZB, ), ZB, P*(ZA, ZB, )). We will abbreviate this without confusion as Hni*(ZA, P*, ZB, P*).
We can see that if r*,r* E /* then Hi(zA, Finally we note that since K is a continuous function on the compact set S x S, it has a minimum on this set at some (z*, z*). Such a pair satisfies (2) and (3). Equilibrium locations exist.
Q.E.D.
We have shown that the existence of a location-price equilibrium depends on the existence of locations such that each location minimizes social cost with respect to the other's location. Such locations do exist and one equilibrium pair may be found by minimizing K(ZA, ZB) on the compact set S x S. If a firm anticipates that equilibrium prices will be employed by the other firm and the other firm's location will be fixed, the firm will strive to minimize social cost, not its own production cost to maximize its profit. However, equilibrium locations need not minimize social cost globally as the following example illustrates. EXAMPLE: Consider a market consisting of circular submarkets of radius e, e < , having constant unit demand, whose centers are located at the points (1 -e, 1), (1 -e, -1), (-1 + e, -1), (-1 + e, 1) . See Figure 1 . We will assume that transport cost is proportional to Euclidean distance. 
PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIUM LOCATIONS
We next discuss various properties of equilibrium locations. In this section we will generally assume that transport cost is proportional to Euclidean distance, fA(zA, z) = aAIIZ -ZAII2, aA>O. Similarly for B. Differential properties of a firm's profit with respect to location are described in the following lemma supplied without proof. We will understand JJSA VZAfA(ZA, z)p(z) dz to be a vector valued integral. We note that the derivative of HA with respect to ZA is just the negative of the derivative of A's transport and production costs. We begin our survey of properties of equilibrium locations with the following result about location of identical firms. 
Location of Nonidentical Firms
We can establish a similar result about noncoincident location for the case of two nonidenticalfirms. A few preliminary results will prove helpful and add insight to properties that equilibrium locations of nonidentical firms must obey. 
Q.E.D.
Next, we will require the market region served to be a "circular" market region: the market is a disc with the center at the origin having radius 1. Also we will assume that p is uniform. Our goal is to demonstrate in this simple situation that coincident location for nonidentical duopolists will never be an equilibrium. Developing this result in steps, we have the following theorem. The proof is a computation found in the Appendix. With coincident location at the origin, the firm with the higher transport rate and lower marginal cost of production will be located at a local minimum of its profit as a function of its location choice. The firm with the higher marginal cost of production will be at a local minimum of its profit with respect to its location if the difference between the firm's transport rates is small. If the difference is large, it will be at a local maximum. Holding CB -CA fixed, we may explicitly state what "small" and "large" mean. See Figure 2 . We can summarize the last three theorems and state the following: THEOREM 10: Let two nonidenticalfirms be located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution. If (zA, z*) are equilibrium locations and both firms serve markets having positive demand, then z* $ z* and the firms must be located on a common diameter on opposite sides of the origin.
EXTENSIONS
Our model of two firm competition is readily generalizable. In subsequent works we will supply the details; here we point out obvious directions.
The model may be extended to study n-firm competition, and it may be seen that a location-price equilibrium will exist. In addition, we may allow each firm to control a number of mobile plants or warehouses which may or may not be identical. The coordination problem of the firm in the context of competition may be studied and again a location-price equilibrium may be shown to exist.
We can also allow the firms to have location dependent fixed costs and marginal costs of production. Specifically, we may allow the firms to have linear homogeneous production functions, and assume there to be fixed factor sites in the market region. Then the firm's problem will be to compete in price and location, all the while worrying about how location affects the optimal mix of factors and the marginal cost of production. Thie existence of a location-price equilibrium and its properties are presented in Hurter and Lederer [10] .
The results of this work are general in compact spaces other than of location in a subset of R2 because no special properties of R2 were used in establishing a location-price equilibrium. We need only require that whatever the compact space along with an appropriately defined measure in which we are working, f2 and p2 are both integrable. This means a location-price equilibrium exists in problems of competitive location in discrete point markets, and on networks, and in spaces of dimension higher than two. Application of our model to problems of competitive network design, i.e., in the transport and telecommunications industries is found in Lederer [11] .
The results also apply in location problems involving product differentiation, i.e., product attributes. In this case, firms are locating their technology or product and are customizing the product to customers' specifications and setting a "delivered" price for this service. Thus, competitive product differentiation under discriminatory pricing can be studied with our model. This model is also applicable to many firm competitors with multiple facilities. The development of that model, found in Lederer [12] , is similar to that presented here and a location-price equilibrium is shown to exist.
It may be asked does a location-price equilibrium exist in markets with elastic demand? Unfortunately our methods which rely upon the decomposition of the firm's profit function, willl not be useful. It can be shown that for specific examples a location-price equilibrium will exist. However, general existence has yet to be demonstrated. Some results can be found in Lederer 
